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Abstract 
Studies on the changing labor relations in post-communist countries have flourished in recent years, such that a 
review and analysis of what has been reported is overdue. Yet, interestingly, these studies have not reached a 
consensus on what they seek to explain. Indeed, some of the main questions remain under contention. First, is labor 
in post-communist societies weak, or (in at least some countries) strong? What should the referent be in determining 
strength or weakness? To the extent labor is weak, what would explain this weakness? If labor's power varies 
throughout the region, what would explain this variation? There have been a number of answers posed to these 
questions to date, but not a thorough testing of rival hypotheses. This paper will demonstrate, using a variety of 
measures, that labor is indeed a weak social and political actor in post-communist societies, especially when 
compared to labor in western Europe. This general weakness is rather surprising when one examines it against the 
now considerable economic and political diversity that exists in the post-communist world. The paper will then 
examine a number of hypotheses that have been proposed to explain labor's weakness, concluding that the 
institutional legacies of post-communist trade unions, and the ideological legacy of the discourse of class, best 
explain this overall weakness. However, the concept of legacy is itself found wanting, since it is unable to account 
for the extent of this weakness or the trends that have occurred in the region over time.   2
As the EU moves to expand into several post-communist countries, the transforma-
tion of industrial relations in eastern Europe becomes increasingly important.  To what ex-
tent are eastern European unions and workplaces like those in western Europe, and to what 
extent are they distinct, and what might the consequences be for a broader Europe?  This 
paper will argue that while labor around the world is on the defensive, workers in post-
communist societies are facing unique dilemmas.  Moreover, labor’s quiescence in post-
communist societies has important implications for these countries as they seek to further 
integrate themselves into the global economy and attempt to consolidate their fledgling 
democracies. 
Studies on the changing labor relations in post-communist countries have flourished 
in recent years, such that a review and analysis of what has been reported is overdue.  Yet, 
interestingly, these studies have not reached a consensus on what they seek to explain.  In-
deed, some of the main questions remain under contention.  First, is labor in post-
communist societies weak, or (in at least some countries) strong?  And strong or weak com-
pared to what?  To the extent labor is weak, what would explain this weakness?  If labor’s 
power varies throughout the region, what would explain this variation?  There have been a 
number of answers posed to these questions to date, but not a thorough testing of rival 
hypotheses.  
This article will demonstrate, using a variety of measures, that labor is indeed a weak 
social and political actor in post-communist societies, especially when compared to labor in 
western Europe.  This overall weakness in the region is rather surprising when one examines 
it against the now considerable economic and political diversity that exists in the post-
communist world.  It will then assess the effectiveness of several arguments that have been 
proposed to explain labor’s weakness, concluding that the institutional and ideological   3
legacies of the communist period best explain this overall weakness. However, the concept 
of legacy is itself found wanting, since it is unable to account for the extent of this weakness 
or the trends that have occurred in the region over time.  
While just a few years ago one could argue that “this has been a relatively neglected 
area of research,” (Thirkell, et al, 1998: preface) this statement no longer rings true. As such 
concepts as globalization command greater attention worldwide, there has now been a flow-
ering of studies focusing on changing labor relations in post-communist countries.
1  Yet 
these studies have not reached a consensus on what they seek to explain. Let us briefly ex-
amine some of the points of contention.  
First, is labor a weak actor in post-communist societies overall, or is labor, in at least 
some of these countries, rather strong?  While the majority of these new studies point to 
labor weakness,
2 some argue that relative strength is the most compelling finding.  Ekiert 
and Kubik conclude that at least in the early post-communist period, “collective protest in 
Poland was intense,” as “[w]aves of strikes swept through entire sectors of the economy” 
(1999; Seleny, 1999; Osa, 1998).  Others argue that the “the hallmark of labor mobilization 
in post-communism is variation not uniformity. Indeed, there has been enormous variation” 
(Robertson, 2001).  
Regarding corporatist institutions, which virtually all post-communist societies have 
tried to establish, there is considerable disagreement as well.  Some have referred to “trans-
formative corporatism” (Iankova, 1998), while others have argued that corporatism in the 
region is “illusory” (Ost, 2000).  There is even disagreement on some basic empirical points: 
                                                 
1 Crowley and Ost, 2001;Ekiert and Kubik, 1999; Greskovits, 1998; Iankova, 1998; Kubicek, 1999;  Meardi, 2000; Orenstein 
and Hale, 2001; Ost , 2000; Pollert, 1999; Robertson, 2001; Thirkell, Petkov, and Vickerstaff, 1998.  There are a number of 
other studies, particularly those that focus on single countries.  
2 Crowley and Ost, 2001; Greskovits, 1998; Kubicek, 1999; Meardi, 2000; Ost , 2000; Pollert, 1999; Thirkell, Petkov, and 
Vickerstaff, 1998.    4
whether, for example, the trade union movements in such countries as Russia and Hungary 
are centralized or fragmented.
3  
  While some of these disagreements result from different points of reference (weak, 
or fragmented, compared to what?), the question of comparative reference has been pre-
cisely the shortcoming of a number of these studies. Even among those who argue that labor 
is indeed weak throughout the region, it is unclear how this weakness is being measured, or 
to what this relative weakness is being contrasted, other than the expectation of significant 
labor mobilization. A number of studies are focused on single countries, while other studies 
of labor in post-communist societies base their conclusion on the comparison of between 
two to four cases, quickly running into the well-known problem of more variables than cases 
(Ekiert and Kubik, 1999; Pollert, 1999; Iankova and Turner, 2000; Robertson, 2001). 
Indeed, some of the best studies have limitations along these lines. Greskovits 
(1998), while making fruitful comparisons between Latin America and eastern Europe, omits 
countries from the former Soviet Union, and largely relies on the Hungarian case for empiri-
cal conclusions. Ekiert and Kubik, while compiling a considerable database of protest active-
ty, confine their study to four countries and the years 1989-1993.  While such limitations are 
understandable given the arduous task of data collection, it is time to test their findings be-
yond these specific time and places.  
  This focus on a relatively few cases would help explain why a rather large number of 
explanations have been proposed for labor’s relative weakness.  In fact, there have been at 
least five broad types of explanations proposed by various scholars to explain the weakness 
                                                 
3 For studies that draw opposite conclusions about Russian trade unions, see Robertson, 2001, and Chen and Sil, 2001.  A 
discussion of the Hungarian case will follow.   5
of post-communist labor (these will be expanded upon in the sections that follow).
4  The 
first concerns the corporatist institutions mentioned above.  The second type of explanation 
we might call union competition: unions will be more militant when there are a number of 
unions competing with each other for members and resources.  A third type of explanation 
is based on the economic theory of strikes, which are said to be more difficult in conditions 
of economic downturn and high unemployment.  A related, and fourth type of explanation 
points to the use of individual “exit” rather then collective “voice.”  A final explanation for 
labor weakness in post-communism has relied on the notion of legacy, especially the institu-
tional legacy of trade unions created in the communist period, and the ideological legacy of a 
regime that ruled in the name of the working class as a hindrance to worker action, and even 
identity, in the post-communist setting.  
  These various explanations are potentially complementary, and no single explanation 
need be, nor likely is, able to explain the phenomenon of labor weakness on its own.  Never-
theless, this is a large number of potential explanations, arguably the result of relying on a 
few cases.  This paper will attempt to survey a broader range of post-communist cases, al-
lowing for the elimination of some of the explanations that have previously been proposed.  
While there are inevitable tradeoffs in such an approach – the richness of individual cases is 
lost, and we risk blurring distinctions that might be made with a more limited focus – the 
potential gain of narrowing down this list of explanations is well worth taking.  
  Is labor a weak political social actor in this part of the world?  Just a few years ago 
many social scientists were predicting just the opposite. This argument was certainly made by 
those studying the developing world and the political economy of economic reform (Prze-
                                                 
4 A sixth type of explanation focuses on the political alliances of unions, and has elsewhere been called political exchange 
theory (Franzosi): unions become restive when their political partners are in opposition, and less so when their political   6
worski 1991: 182; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995: 269; (Walton and Seddon, 1994; see the dis-
cussion in Greskovits). While most of these conclusions were based on evidence from the 
Third World, especially Latin America, others focusing on the former Second World made 
similar predictions.  Not least because of Poland’s Solidarity movement and its central role in 
ending communism, the assessment of workers as powerful social actors carried over into 
the post-communist era, and this assumption was implicit in the arguments for both radical 
and gradual economic helped shape strategies of economic transformation (Crawford, 1995: 
27-28; Poznanski 1995: 220 219).  
To these initial expectations of labor unrest, we must add that the economic hard-
ship following the end of Communism has been much greater than almost anyone expected 
– in eastern Europe rivaling the Great Depression, and in much of the former Soviet exceed-
ing it (Milanovic, 1998:6).
5  Concerning workers in particular, during this transition depres-
sion the real wage bill was cut by approximately one-third in eastern Europe and one-half in 
the former Soviet Union; “both cuts are larger than those experienced by labor in major 
countries during the Great Depression (Milanovic, 1998: 29-30).  All of which leads to the 
following question:  What has labor’s response to these changes actually been? 
 
Labor’s Minimal Response 
  One simple measure of labor’s strength is the rate of union membership, or density.  
Other things being equal, one would expect that higher union density would indicate a 
stronger labor movement (Golden, Wallerstein and Lange, 1999).  Union membership rates 
have dropped precipitously in post-communist societies (Kubicek, 1998).  In recent years 
                                                                                                                                                 
partners are in power. Solely for reasons of space, it will not be discussed further here. For full discussion of this argument 
see Crowley, 2002.  
5 While official figures may fail to capture informal economic activity, other measures put the decline at only slightly lower 
levels (Milanovic, 1998: 26).   7
union density has dropped in many places throughout the world, yet nowhere more so than 
in eastern Europe: in western Europe the number of union members declined between 1985 
and 1995 by 15.6 percent; in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union membership de-
clined by 35.9 percent (ILO, 1997:2, 238).
6  
  Yet clearly the decline in unionization rates in once-communist countries is to be ex-
pected.  Union membership was quite high in the communist period, and in some cases vir-
tually mandatory.  With this in mind, declining union density appears inevitable, and one 
might argue that the former communist countries are simply converging to the west Euro-
pean norm.  Indeed, Thirkell et al. argue that post-communist unions are now “close to the 
western realities of pluralism. As for the levels of unionization, it comes closer to the stan-
dards of the Scandinavian and north European countries” (Thirkell, Petkov and Vickerstaff, 
1998: 86).  And according to the ILO data shown in figure 1, unionization rates are still high-
er in post-communist countries than in western Europe: as of 1995, average union density 
for these west European countries was 36.8 percent; for post-communist Europe average 
density was 43.8 percent (ILO, 1997).  
Yet the argument for convergence in union density relies on questionable data.  The 
ILO figures largely rely on numbers reported by trade union federations themselves.  Survey 
results suggest these figures are inflated: for western European, union density drops from 
38.9 percent with self-reported figures to 34.5 percent using survey data (see fig. 2).  How-
ever, according to survey data the density rates for post-communist countries not only drop, 
they drop precipitously – from 49.2 percent according to the self-reported figures to 29.6 
                                                 
6 For Bulgaria and Romania, the years of comparison were 1991 and 1993; For Slovakia and the Czech Republic, the years 
were 1990 and 1995.    8
percent according to survey results (Ingelhart, et al, 2000; Howard, 2002).
7  This is close to a 
20 percent differential between the official and the survey results. 
 
Fig. 1: Union Density, Official Data
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  There are several other points worth noting about the east European union density 
figures (see fig. 2A).  First, and rather surprisingly, Poland is the least unionized of those 
post-communist countries surveyed (and a close second to Estonia according to the ILO 
data).  Second, only the post-Soviet states of Belarus and Russia have density figures that are 
higher than the west European average.  Moreover, as we will discuss below, since trends in 
union membership do not bode well for labor, the density rates have almost certainly de-
clined further since these surveys were completed in 1995-1997.  And yet, despite starting 
from much higher union membership rates, within a few years post-communist societies 
                                                 
7 Howard (2002) reports a lower figure of 19.6 percent for post-communist union membership, but I have adjusted the 
survey data so it reflects only the non-agricultural labor force.    9
were already at lower average density rates than their west European counterparts.  Far from 
converging to west European norms, post-communist countries have overshot the mark, 
and appear headed towards Anglo-American levels of union density.  
Figure 2: Union Density, Official and Survey Rates
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However, unionization rates can only tell part of the story.  Another logical place to 
look for signs of labor militancy or quiescence is strike activity.  Intuitively at least, given the 
extent of the transition depression, one would expect to see signs of labor unrest and strike 
activity in the region, if not universally, then at least in certain countries or sectors.  
A good indicator for making cross-national comparisons of strike statistics is relative 
volume, or the number of workers involved in labor disputes, relative to the total number of   10
workers employed (cf. Shalev, 1992).  Figure 2 shows the rates of strikes thus measured for 
western and eastern European countries for which there is comparable data.
8 
 The results are rather surprising. The unweighted average strike rate for these west 
European countries is 116 days not worked per thousand workers per year. The comparable 
figure for east European countries is twenty-one.
9 Certainly there is great variation in the 
strike rates for west European countries. What is most surprising is that even the most 
strike-prone east European countries come nowhere near the strike rates of the most strike-
prone west European countries.
10  
                                                 
8 Exact comparisons between countries are difficult since different methods are used for compiling statistics. Nevertheless, 
the difference between western and eastern Europe are large enough to suggest a real difference in the phenomenon being 
measured. As Shalev (1992) notes, the limitations of strike statistics well-known, but so is the equally well rehearsed reply – 
they are better than nothing. In her discussion of the Russian case, Javeline (forthcoming) finds that survey evidence sup-
ports the general parameters of the official strike data.  
9 The figures for western Europe are from 1989-1998, and for eastern Europe for 1991-1999, though data are missing for 
some countries in some years. (ILO, 2000a; Davies, 2000.) 
10 In their study of protest events in four east central European countries, Gregorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik found that “the 
magnitude of protest is by and large lower than in more established democracies” (1998: 573,original emphasis).  Since their study re-
lied on the content analysis of newspaper accounts, it provides another indirect support for the general shape of the strike 
data. Moreover, since their study looked at protest generally, their findings suggest that quiescence is not confined to work-
ers, a conclusion that might also be extended to civil society generally (Howard, 2002).  
Fig. 2A: Union Density, Official and Survey Data
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  Moreover, the finding of labor quiescence among industrial workers is furthered 
when we break down the strike data by sector. In Russia, which has the highest strike rate in 
the region, a majority of those on strike have been teachers. More precisely, from 1992-1999, 
54 percent and 56 percent of strikes when measured by days not worked and workers 
involved respectively, took place in the education sector (ILO, 2000a).  
Fig. 3: Strike rates, days not worked per thousand workers, 
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In addition to union density and strike rates, there are a number of other signs of 
weakness as well: there was a sharp decline in real wages throughout the region over the last 
decade, and while wages have since risen in many countries, wages are still quite low in com-
parative terms, even for those countries slated to join the EU in the near future (Havlik, 
2000). Just as staggering has been the decline in the number of employees covered by col-
lective bargaining agreements, a trend that is significant since “substantial declines in union 
coverage would indicate an erosion of the ability of trade unions to influence wage levels” 
(Golden, Wallertein and Lange, 1999: 202). While collective agreements were virtually com-  12
pulsory if fairly meaningless in the communist period, one hope was that these agreements 
might be filled with real meaning in a market economy. Yet by 1995 the percentage of em-
ployees covered by such agreements had declined to 55 percent in the Czech Republic and  
45 percent in Hungary (see fig. 4). The comparable figure for available west European 
countries was 75 percent (ILO, 1997: 248).
 11 
 
Even these figures appear misleading when probed more closely. A recent study by 
Laszlo Neumann (2002) of collective bargaining in Hungary finds that agreements cover  
51 percent of Hungarian employees in the private sector, a higher percentage than that in fig. 
4. Yet when these agreements were investigated further, it was discovered that 80 percent of 
the agreements were at the company level, roughly opposite of the experience of continental 
western Europe (where most agreements are still made at the sectoral if not the central 
                                                 
 11 In Germany collective bargaining rates have declined as well, according to one study to 70.1 percent of all employees in 
2000, still about the west European average cited here. In east Germany the coverage was significantly lower, at 55.4 per-
Fig. 4: Collective Bargaining Coverage Rates (1995)
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level).  Moreover, in Hungary “many company agreements are far from being real negotiated 
agreements, but are either defined unilaterally by employers or, following state socialist tradi-
tions, simply repeat the law” (Neumann: 12).  Further still, in 37 percent of Hungarian col-
lective agreements, there is no stipulation for wages.  Since this would appear to make the 
Hungarian collective bargaining system more like the U.S. model than that of most other ad-
vanced capitalist economies, Neumann follows the practice of U.S. industrial relations stud-
ies and examines the union wage gap, or the wage premium that, after controlling for sector 
and occupation, unionized workers receive over their non-unionized counterparts.  In the 
U.S. the wage gap is typically somewhere between 5-25 percent. In Hungary, the gap is a 
mere 3-5 percent, suggesting that, on the issue of collective bargaining, even when the point 
of comparison is the U.S., Hungarian unions don’t fare well.  
More broadly, case studies of individual countries focusing on the question of labor 
strength and weakness have reached similar conclusions (Crowley and Ost, 2001).  While 
there is variation in labor mobilezation within post-communist countries, the available sug-
gests that the most important variation is that between eastern European and western Euro-
pean norms.  In short, labor does indeed appear to be a weak social actor in post-communist 
Europe. The question we must now address is why.  
As we have seen, a number of explanations have been proposed to account for labor 
weakness in post-communist societies. Given space limitations, we can only present a cur-
sory discussion of these arguments here, since to fully discuss their merits would require a 
full-length article in each case.  Nevertheless, we intend to present enough discussion to jus-
tify the claim that the impact of communist-era legacies better explain the phenomenon of 
labor weakness than the other proposed explanations.  
                                                                                                                                                 
cent in 2000. Institute for Employment Research, reported in “European Industrial Relations Observatory On-line,” http:   14
Post-Communist Corporatism 
In interpreting the indicators of labor weakness we have just seen, some might argue 
that such figures as strike rates can be interpreted in a number of different ways.  A low 
strike rate might not be a sign of the weakness of organized labor, but rather a sign of 
strength (Kelly, 1998: 10).  Several of the western European countries in figure 3 have 
relatively low strike rates, in some cases lower than the average for eastern Europe. The tra-
ditional explanation for low strike rates in certain western European countries is the strength 
of those countries’ corporatist institutions (Wallace and Jenkins, 1995; Schmitter, 1981; 
Cameron, 1984).  
  Post-communist societies explicitly sought to build corporatist institutions, in no 
small part from their desire to “join Europe.”  Indeed, throughout eastern Europe tripartism 
— the institutionalized intermediation of the interests of labor, capital, and the state – “has 
become a regular feature of the social landscape” (Ost, 2000: 504).  The issue of corporatism 
is a crucial one, not only because applicant countries to the EU want to be seen as adopting 
European institutions, but because the future of “Social Europe” rests to a considerable ex-
tent on the quality of interest representation among its new entrants.
12  
Not only have tripartite institutions been widespread in the region, the question of 
corporatism has been the most widely discussed aspect of labor relations in post-communist 
countries.  Given this extensive literature, we will review it only very briefly here, and will fo-
cus on changes over time in tripartite institutions, to ask whether such changes have resulted 
in changes in labor peace or mobilization.  
A number of commentators have argued that tripartism has indeed contributed to 
labor peace in the region  (Hethy, 1994; Iankova, 1998).  Iankova and Turner (2000) argue 
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that, despite setbacks, tripartism has “helped shape the coming of markets everywhere in 
eastern Europe, in processes we call ‘transformative corporatism’.”
13  Hungary in particular 
has been cited as a strong case of corporatism: Kornai (1996, cited in Ekiert and Kubik, 
1998) referred to tripartism as a second government, while Hethy (1995: 92) characterized it 
as a rival to parliament.  
Such statements notwithstanding, the majority of the studies of post-communist cor-
poratism have found these institutions to be rather weak and ineffective. Indeed, the lan-
guage used is often quite strong: corporatism in the region has been described as “paternal-
ist” (Tatur, 1995), “illusory” (Ost, 2000), and a “sham” (Rutland). Rather than leading to 
social democratic outcomes, the process has been described as “fragile tripartism subordin-
ate to neo-liberal dictates” (Pollert, 1999: 165) and a “political shell for a neo-liberal econo-
mic strategy” (Thirkell, Petkov and Vickerstaff, 1998: 166).
14  
  Ekiert and Kubik, in what is certainly the most impressive empirical study of protest 
in post-communism to date, tackle the question of why Poland appears so much more strike 
prone than Hungary (1998; 1999; see also Seleny, 1999). They argue that protest is a rational 
response to lack of access, such as the lack of corporatist inclusion, and they hypothesize 
that one could expect fewer strikes where there is institutionalized tripartism. They argue 
quite plausibly for the period of 1989-1993 that the difference between strike-prone Poland 
and quiescent Hungary is a social democratic party and institutionalized access to policy- 
making in the latter case, but not in the former.  Moreover, Poland’s strike rates drop dra-
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Iankova and Turner (2000); Kowalsky (2000).  
13 See also (ILO, 1997). A more equivocal account of corporatism in the region is given by Orenstein and Hale (2001).  
14 Other studies reaching similar conclusions include Kubicek, 1999; Crowley and Ost, 2001; Heinisch; Connor, 1996.   16
matically after the establishment of tripartism in mid-decade and the coming to power of the 
SLD, a left/social democratic party.
15 
While this is a significant correlation, the evidence for the second half of the decade 
does not sustain the argument.  In Hungary the Socialist government in 1995 abandoned 
talks aimed at establishing a social pact when an agreement appeared out of reach, and uni-
laterally enacted austerity measures and other neo-liberal policies.  As one source put it, “the 
most ambitious corporatist experiment to date in the region ended in failure” (Kubicek, 
1999: 223; see also Toth, 2001; Greskovits, 1998).  While there was subsequently a signifi-
cant railway workers’ strike in Hungary, when tripartism was reestablished it was “reduced to 
consultation and information rather than negotiation and decision-making,” a far cry from 
being a second parliament, and this was before a right-wing government openly hostile to la-
bor came to power in 1998 (Pollert, 1999: 144; Ost, 2000; Toth, 2001).  Further, in Poland, 
the establishment of tripartism in 1994 may have contributed to a decline in strikes (Oren-
stein and Hale, 2001: 277-78), but the subsequent virtual breakdown of negotiations, and a 
walkout by the leading OPZZ union federation, did not lead to an increase in strikes or 
other significant reaction from labor.
16  If corporatism appears able to explain labor peace at 
one time, it is not able to explain it in another.  
Moreover, even if corporatism could provide an explanation for labor peace in cer-
tain times and places, it is unable to account for the low rates of mobilization relative to 
western Europe that we have seen throughout the region.  In other words, corporatism 
                                                 
15 Poland’s strike rate (days not worked per thousand workers per year) for 1993-1994 was 60.5, while it was 5.8 in Hungary 
(and Polish data is unavailable for 1992, which would bring the figure higher).  But for 1995-1999 the Polish rate drops sub-
stantially to 5.3, while the Hungarian rate rises to 21.5. (ILO, 2000).  Thus by this measure, Seleny’s contention that “Labor 
mobilization, then, has become a conspicuous and enduring characteristic of political life in Poland” (1999:490) appears un-
warranted.  
16 (Ost, 2000).   17
cannot be invoked as it has been in western Europe to explain the considerable variation in 
labor activity, simply because in eastern Europe that variation is so much more limited.  
 
Union Competition 
Ekiert and Kubik raise a second argument to explain the difference in strike activity 
between Poland and its east central European neighbors.  Citing social movement theory 
that suggests movements in competetion will adopt more radical tactics in search of support, 
they argue: “We expect more strikes if there are many unions competing for the same ‘audi-
ence’” (1999: 189) and likewise, “The higher the number of unions, the higher the probabili-
ty of protest” (1998).  This explains the Polish case, they argue, because from 1989-1993 at 
least “Poland had the most pluralistic and competitive union sector in eastern Europe” 
(1999: 106)  
  While in their view “fragmentation leads to competition”
 (1999:106) and then to 
mobilization, the standard view in labor relations suggests just the opposite, since fragmenta-
tion and rivalry lessen solidarity, labor’s central resource (Cameron, 1984).  Others see just 
such a problem in post-communist societies (Heinisch, 1999; Orenstein and Hale, 2001; Ku-
bicek, 1999; Chen and Sil, 2001).  In the view of some, while there may be benefits to union 
pluralism, there is a dilemma of pluralism versus fragmentation, and “the second trend is 
gaining ground and fragmentation is already a fact in most countries.”
17  
Indeed, not only is there a theoretical debate about the impact of union pluralism, 
but also about the empirical question of which countries have fragmented unions and which 
do not.  Hungary, one of the cases Ekiert and Kubik argue has a “centralized labor sector,” 
is said by another study to have “the greatest degree of union pluralism in the region,” with   18
over a hundred trade union organizations united into several confederations, with nine par-
ticipating in the national tripartite negotiations (Kubicek, 1999; see also Frege and Toth, 
1999 :120-121; Orenstein and Hale, 2001; Toth, 2001; Pollert, 1999 : 165-166).  
  Still the argument about union competition spurring mobilization would stress rival-
ry within sectors and firms, rather than at the national level.  A slight revision of the Ekiert 
and Kubik hypothesis states that “where there are multiple labor unions seeking a following 
within the same sector of the labor force, and these unions represent a real threat to each 
other, unions will compete for support” (Robertson, 2001:7).  And Greskovits argues that 
for Hungary, “while pluralism was characteristic at the national level, … in most cases only 
one of the unions was present at the industrial sector level and in the workplace” (1998: 160-
1).  This appears to overstate the case, however, since union rivalry at the workplace level in 
Hungary was sufficient to lead to workplace elections in 1993 to determine worker represen-
tation within firms, a step sought in part by employers who wanted “to avoid chaotic multi-
unionism and the continuous emergence of new unions” (Toth, 2001: 44).
18  Nonetheless, 
multiple unions within the workplace appear much more common in Poland and Bulgaria, 
two countries where labor has often mobilized (Eikert and Kubik, 1999; Robertson, 2001). 
Yet relative labor militancy is also apparent in Romania, perhaps the most consistently as-
sertive workforce in the region. Here there is union fragmentation as well, with “many mini-
unions, federations, and confederations at all levels of society.”  Yet, “though there are de-
grees of overlap, the main confederations are still somewhat based in industrial sectors with 
different ownership principles and production profiles, differences that produce different in-
                                                                                                                                                 
17 (Thirkell, Petkov and Vickerstaff, 1998: 87). In their view,  “fragmentation results in a numerical decline depriving some 
union centers of the critical mass of members needed for mobilization and pressure through branch and national actions,” 
almost precisely the opposite hypothesis of Eikert and Kubik. 
18 While the main union MSZOSZ dominated those elections, the puzzle of labor peace in Hungary begins before the elec-
tions in 1993.    19
terests and orientations” (Kideckel, 2001: 104).
19  Thus the differences in union pluralism 
between these countries may be differences in degree rather than in kind.  
  Also problematic for the union competition argument is the unstated assumption 
that unions, at least when faced with rivals, seek to increase their membership.  Yet in many 
cases, including Poland, there has been a virtual lack of attempts by post-communist unions 
to organize new members, whether in non-unionized or in unionized firms, since recruiting 
new members is too reminiscent of the compulsory membership of the past (Pollert, 1999; 
Ost, 2001).  
 
Unemployment and Labor Protest 
  Certainly, the tremendous economic transformation in post-communist societies has 
had a profound impact on labor.  Intuitively, we would expect to see some signs of labor un-
rest in conditions of economic depression, falling real wages and high unemployment.  How-
ever, the economic theory of strikes states that workers act collectively not when they are 
weak but when they are strong, that is, when unemployment is low and it is easier to pres-
sure employers (Kennan, 1986; Soskice, 1978; for a critical discussion, see Hyman and Ed-
wards, 1994; Franzosi).  In the industrial relations literature, “That unemployment under-
mines union bargaining power is axiomatic” (Ross and Martin, 1999: 14).  
Despite economic growth, some ten years into the transformation workers in the re-
gion remain in a clearly  weakened bargaining position.  As of 2001, unemployment was 10 
percent throughout most of the region, and in Poland, Slovakia, and much of Balkans it was 
20 percent, with little sign of improvement in the offing.
20  
                                                 
19 Likewise, Thompson and Traxler (1997) find that, “rivalling Hungary for complexity,” in Romania “independent con-
federations formed largely from autonomous and sectoral bodies.” 
20 Business Central Europe. See also Boeri and Bruno (1997).   20
  If weak labor markets are the explanation for labor quiescence in post-communist 
societies, we would expect to see an inverse relationship between the levels of unemploy-
ment and strike activity.  When comparing across countries however this relationship does 
not hold.  In fact, the relationship often seems to work in the opposite direction of that ex-
pected: looking at the average of annual rates unemployment and strikes through the 1990s, 
relatively low unemployment in the Czech Republic (3.3 percent on average) coincided with 
low levels of labor activity (2.1 strike days per thousand workers), while in Romania unem-
ployment was quite a bit higher (9.2 percent), but the strike rate much more so (32.5). Yet 
even this pattern is not consistent: unemployment has been even higher in Slovakia (14.3 
percent) than in Romania, with few signs of labor unrest (UN, 2000; ILO, 2000a). For the 
region as a whole, the correlation between annual unemployment levels and strike rates is 
close to zero (see figure 5).  
Perhaps it is not entirely surprising that unemployment figures cannot explain cross-
national variations in labor movement activity.  National traditions and institutions are im-
portant.  However, changes in individual countries over time appear to have little impact 
either: while the number of data points per country is quite small, to the extent there are cor-
relations, they are in the opposite direction of that expected by the economic theory of 
strikes.  To flesh out one example, in Hungary unemployment has declined somewhat, from 
a high of 12.3 percent in 1992 to under 8 percent in 2000, but there has been little sign that 
unions have used any relative tightening in the labor market to press for higher wages (Toth, 
2001).  At the very least, we can conclude there is no simple relationship between unem-
ployment and labor activity in post-communist Europe.
21 
                                                 
21 Command and McHale find little consistent correlation between unemployment and wages in transition countries, wheth-
er aggregate or regional data is used (1996: 301). More broadly, Eikert and Kubik (1999) find little support for relative de-
privation hypotheses in their comparisons of protest in the region.    21
  
 
Exit 
  A number of people have pointed to another component of the labor market not 
captured by unemployment statistics – the existence of individual “exit” options such as 
work in the informal economy (Hirschman, 1970).  Thus Greskovits argues that “rather than 
voice, it has been exit that has dominated the pattern of social responses to economic stress 
in the east,” and that “the most frequent response has been not strikes…, but a “shift to the 
informal economy” (1998: 87, 17) which has involved a “massive exit from formal econo-
my” (92; Nelson, 1997).  
  Yet there are grounds for questioning just how extensive the use of “exit” is.
22  One 
place to look for the extent of exit is turnover data, or the inflows and outflows between em-
                                                 
22 There are also theoretical grounds for questioning the characterization of “exit” as a matter of rational choice, since in 
many if not most cases, particularly outside of central Europe, these “options” appear largely undesired outcomes, and not 
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ployment, unemployment, and non-participation in the labor force.  If exit levels were high 
in post-communist countries, we would expect to find high levels of turnover.  Yet this does 
not appear to be the case.  According to a study of labor force surveys in the Czech Repub-
lic, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, “transition economies display, on average, significantly 
lower rates of turnover than their western counterparts” (see table 1).  Differences in churn-
ing rates – a measure of the amount of job reallocation beyond that needed to meet net 
change in employment -- “are even more marked” (Boeri and Bruno, 1997).  Turnover in 
Russia appears a bit higher than in these east European cases, but not more so than is typical 
in OECD countries (Gimpelson and Lippoldt, 2001).  
However, turnover rates may not fully reflect the extent of exit, since the informal 
sector is only partly captured by the labor force surveys from which turnover data is derived 
(Boeri and Bruno, 1997).  For that we can look at estimates of the size of the informal econ-
omy in various countries (see Table 2, from Johnson, Kaufman and Shleifer, 1997). This 
measure would indeed seem to explain some of the cases. For example, the level is high in 
Hungary, and low Poland, and as we have seen Hungary certainly has a much lower level of 
labor mobilization than Poland (at least for the first half of the 1990’s). In Russia and 
Ukraine the informal economy is large, consistent with the argument that despite severe 
economic conditions in those countries, protest has been relatively low.  However, the size 
of the informal economy in Bulgaria is also quite high, and so is the amount of labor protest; 
conversely in Slovakia the size of the informal economy is much lower than in Hungary, but 
with few signs of unrest.  Moreover, changes in the size of the informal economy over time 
with few signs of unrest.  Moreover, changes in the size of the informal economy over time 
within countries do not appear to correlate with labor activity.  For example, according to 
                                                                                                                                                 
so much chosen as adopted out of desperation because collective options are so difficult to bring about. This idea is ex-  23
 
Table 1: Labor turnover, 1995 
 
 Labor  turnover 
(6 months) 
Churning index 
Czech Rep.  27.5  9.6 
Poland 29.8  14.5 
Slovakia 22.8  6.1 
Slovenia 11.4  3.7 
ECE avg.  22.9  8.5 
EU avg  41.5  19.4 
(Boeri and Bruno, 1997: 161) 
 
these figures the underground economy in Poland shrinks over time, but then so do strike 
rates – the opposite of the trend one would expect.  Likewise, in Bulgaria the informal 
economy peaks (for the years measured) in 1995 at 36.2 percent of total GDP, but the next 
year Bulgaria witnessed “massive labor protests” (Iankova and Turner, 2000; Robertson, 
2001). 
  Yet the size of the informal economy can be only an imperfect measure, in part 
because, almost by definition, it is so difficult to estimate.  Moreover, the size of the infor-
mal economy as a whole is only a rough indicator of the availability of exit on the labor mar-
ket.  For that we might look, in addition to turnover data, at informal sector employment as 
measured by surveys.  According the ILO, the average level of urban informal sector em-
ployment in selected post-communist countries was on average 10.1 percent of total urban 
sector employment (see figure 6).  Yet this level is far below that of levels in Third World 
countries, where the informal sector is quite high indeed: in Latin America urban informal 
                                                                                                                                                 
plored further in Crowley, 2001.    24
sector employment is 43.2 percent of total urban employment, in Asia it is 32.6 percent, and 
in Africa it is 52.2 percent (ILO, 2000b).
23  
While this last measure is also imperfect, when combined with the data on turnover 
and the size of the informal economy, we must question how much the notion of exit can 
explain labor peace in the region. Indeed, as we have seen in figure 3, a low level of labor ac-
tivity holds across the region despite what are now significantly different macro-economic 
 
 
Table 2: Estimates of the underground economy, 1989-1995 
(Unofficial GDP as a percentage of total GDP) 
 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Poland  15.7 19.6 23.5 19.7 18.5 15.2 12.6 
Czech  Rep.  6.0  6.7  12.9 16.9 16.9 17.6 11.3 
Slovakia  6.0  7.7  15.1 17.6 16.2 14.6  5.8 
Hungary  27.0 28.0 32.9 30.6 28.5 27.7 29.0 
Romania  22.3 13.7 15.7 18.0 16.4 17.4 19.1 
Bulgaria  22.8 25.1 23.9 25.0 29.9 29.1 36.2 
Russia  12.0 14.7 23.5 32.8 36.7 40.3 41.6 
Ukraine  12.0 16.3 25.6 33.6 38.0 45.7 48.9 
(Johnson, Kaufman, and Shleifer, 1997: 183) 
 
conditions, as well as varying levels of unemployment, labor turnover and informal econom-
ic activity in individual countries. 
In this short discussion, we cannot give each of these arguments the full elaboration 
it deserves, nor can we claim to have ruled out these various explanations on their merits. 
                                                 
23 This data does support the argument by Greskovits that there are fewer urban poor in eastern Europe, a group that in   25
However, for present purposes, the most compelling reason to question the explanations we 
have reviewed so far – whether economic explanations focusing on unemployment and the 
labor market, political explanations focusing on corporatism and union competition – is not 
that they fail to explain anything, but rather that they explain the wrong thing. That is, these 
explanations have been proposed to help explain variations within the post-communist 
cases, and to a certain extent and in some combination, they may well do so.  Yet recall that 
in figure 2 we saw the much more rapid decline in union density in eastern Europe, to levels 
below that of western Europe, and that in figure 3, while there was a wide variety of strike 
rates in western Europe, the rates in eastern Europe were universally low. This strongly sug-
gests that the most compelling task is not explaining how the post-communist cases differ, 
but explaining what they have in common.  
Fig. 6: Informal sector employment
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Latin America has often to led rioting or other contentious actions.    26
This is all the more compelling when we recall that more than a decade after the end 
of Communism, the political and economic landscape in the region is quite diverse.  In fact, 
some have argued that this political and economic diversity is the most striking feature of the 
post-communist transformations (Bunce, 1999) while others, pointing to this diversity, have 
even questioned whether there any longer remains something we can call “post-
communism” (King, 2000; Rupnik, 1999).  The politics of the region are diverse enough to 
include both democrats and dictators, embodied in Vaclav Havel and Aleksandr Luka-
shenko.  Economically, by 1998 Poland’s GDP had grown to 117 percent of its 1989 level, 
while in neighboring Ukraine the comparable figure was 39 percent (UN, 2000).  Moreover, 
this considerable diversity within post-communist cases extends not only to broad political 
and economic indicators, but also more narrowly to what we might call industrial relations 
variables – both centralized and pluralist union movements, various modes of privatization, 
the influence of old versus new unions, among other differences (Ost and Crowley, 2001).  
That labor in the region appears to be a weak social actor across such varied political and 
economic conditions suggests there is a factor this region has in common that can help 
explain this common weakness.  That factor, I would suggest, is the continued legacy of the 
communist period. 
 
Institutional and Ideological Legacies 
Perhaps nowhere is the impact of the communist legacy greater than when concern-
ing labor and trade unions. After all, the old regime claimed to rule on behalf of the working 
class.  Moreover, more than a decade after the collapse, the largest trade union in every post-
communist society, including Poland – indeed, in most cases the largest single component of 
civil society – is the union formed and reformed out of the old communist-led union federa-
tion.    27
The impact of this legacy is twofold: institutional and ideological (though these are 
closely intertwined).  Institutionally, these trade unions were first established as entirely dif-
ferent organizations, to operate in an entirely different political economy.  The unions were 
typically allies of management, encouraging increased production, and often operated as so-
cial welfare agencies, dispensing benefits to members, who often viewed such benefits as the 
one advantage of union membership.  
In a market economy, unions need to provide “market/bargaining resources” – 
concessions like higher wages, job security, work conditions, and limitations to managerial 
authority.  These are “the heart of what unions promise to supporters.  If unions deliver, 
they earn enthusiasm, willingness to mobilize, financial support, and loyalty” (Ross and Mar-
tin, 1999: 3).  Unfortunately, this is precisely what post-communist unions have thus far 
failed to do.  Certainly managers find little hindrance from unions: In Hungary, one of the 
better performing post-communist economies, one survey of managers found that trade 
unions and labor issues were almost of no concern; trade unions were described as “irrele-
vant” and having “no influence” on managers’ decisions (Ellingstad, 1997).  
Post-communist unions have faced the daunting challenge not only of reorienting 
themselves to a capitalist economy, but doing so, at least initially, during a period of eco-
nomic depression.  But their challenges come not only from economic decline or even from 
the constraints placed by globalization.  Rather, union members were facing these issues for 
the first time, and were simultaneously reacting to the legacy of communist-era trade union-
ism.  Once the various communist parties were removed from power, trade unions became 
the largest communist-era institutions, and as such they faced significant problems with le-
gitimacy (Greskovits, 1998).  In Pollert’s study of Czech trade unions, for example, she dis-
covered “a fundamentally contradictory conception of what workplace trade unionism   28
should now be about” between leaders and members, “related to a desire to break with the 
past.”  Since unions in the communist period were part of the production bureaucracy, 
members preferred that unions stay out of such issues, and confine themselves to such areas 
as health and safety and breaches of the labor code.  Questions such as work intensity and 
pay “were not a matter for the union, but a private issue for the workers and their mistr (fore-
man),” a point with which union chairs agreed (Pollert, 1999: 196).  
  Yet the problem is not simply that union members are unsure of what unions should 
now do, but also that union leaders and activists, a number of whom helped bring about the 
end of communism, are unsure of what stance to take towards capitalism.  In short, they 
have been unsure about whether they should be defending their workers against capitalism, 
or helping to bring it about.  As Pollert has termed the dilemma, post-communist labor’s 
“ambiguous embrace of the transformation to capitalism” makes unions, in the words of a 
leading Czech unionist, “schizophrenic” (Pollert, 2001: 23).  In Poland, in a survey of ninety-
five manufacturing enterprises, Ost and Weinstein (2000) found that, at a time when the in-
ternal organization of the firm was up for grabs, enterprise-level union leaders were con-
sciously acquiescing to management’s desire for vastly increased authority and to a general 
weakening of trade union influence at the workplace.  And if this is the case in Poland, 
where unions have long had a strong presence in the workplace, what of unions elsewhere?
24  
  Taken together, these legacies have left unions – though often with significant insti-
tutional resources and memberships – with extremely weak links to their members.  Let us 
recall in figure 2 the difference between the membership figures reported by the unions 
themselves and those obtained from surveys.  While it may be true that that former figure is 
                                                 
24 According to Commander and McHale, while “managers have generally acquired significant discretion in firm decisions” 
throughout the post-communist region, a “clear difference between Poland, on the one hand, and the Czech Republic and   29
more technically correct, in that it reflects dues-paying members, the nearly 20 percent dif-
ferential between officially reported membership and those willing to claim union member-
ship in a survey suggests a weak link indeed between these organizations and those they pro-
fess to represent.  
Moreover, this weak link is also suggested by additional survey data.  Surveys 
throughout the region have found that unions are the least trusted civic institutions in each 
case.  For example, the New Barometer Survey, conducted in nine east European countries 
in 1993-94, found that unions received the greatest distrust among civic institutions, exceed-
ed only by the political parties and tied for second in distrust with parliaments out of a total 
of fifteen political and civic institutions (Mishler and Rose, 1997).  In a rough comparison 
with such attitudes in western Europe, Mishler and Rose found that while 37 percent of 
respondents “trusted” trade unions in western Europe, only 13 percent of those in eastern 
Europe did. By 1998 the numbers of those placing trust in trade unions in eastern Europe 
rose significantly to 23 percent, yet 53 percent of respondents stated that they did not trust 
them. Moreover, unions remained the least trusted of civic institutions (Rose and Haerpfer, 
1998). This lack of trust is all the more troubling when one recalls that unions are the largest 
single example of civil society in virtually every country in the region. (see figure 7). 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hungary, on the other, was evident. In the former, workers or workers’ collectives had a clear voice in both the short- and 
long-term decisions of firms, something that was almost completely absent in the other two countries” (1996: 3030).   30
This finding has been confirmed by other surveys as well.  A fourteen-country sur-
vey, though confined to the electronics and electric machinery industries, found that while 
“employee satisfaction with union activities” was 38.7 percent in western European coun-
tries, it was only 15. percent in eastern European countries (Martin, 1998).  Further, accord-
ing to the World Values Survey, in west European societies, 41.1 percent of respondents had 
confidence in trade unions, while only 28.3 percent of post-communist respondents did so 
(Ingelhart, et al, 2000).
25  Overall, this suggests a considerable gap in the amount of trust 
placed in trade unions between eastern and western Europe. 
 
How long do legacies last? 
  It is the legacy of the communist period that best explains this relative lack of trust in 
unions, as well as the overall weakness of labor in post-communist societies.   After all, this 
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communist legacy is about the only thing these increasingly diverse societies have in 
common.
26 
However, the concept of legacy implies that the influence of the past will attenuate 
over time, as the transition progresses, as capitalist class relations solidify, and as old habits 
and institutions are transformed or die out.   This concept also implies that we should expect 
to see less of this legacy where communism itself was less deep, as in the countries of eastern 
Europe as compared to the former Soviet republics.   Following this, one might hypothesize 
that as these countries develop more “normal” capitalist relations, unions will reorient them-
selves and prove better able to defend their members’ interests.
27  Moving farther away from 
communist-era institutions might erode the pathological effects of communist legacies on 
the relative strength of labor, such as workers’ skeptical relationship to trade unions them-
selves.   
However, the concept of legacy, as well as notions of a linear transition and conver-
gence to western norms (which are often implicit in many analyses, as well as in plans for 
EU expansion) fails to adequately capture the extent of labor weakness or the trends that 
have occurred over time.   
Rather than making unions stronger, as reforms have proceeded, unions have gotten 
weaker, or at least certainly smaller.   In countries across the region, the more private the 
economy, the less the union representation (Ost and Crowley, 2001).   Unions are strongest 
in large enterprises in the state sector, a part of the economy clearly in decline.   Unions of-
ten survive in privatized former state firms, but their position is much more tenuous.   And 
they are almost non-existent in the new private firms that have risen in the last decade, as 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 More precisely, as in the other surveys, the figures are the unweighted average of country means in each case. The surveys 
were taken in 1995-97. The post-communist average does not include war-torn Bosnia, in which case the average would rise 
to 29.7 percent.    32
well as in smaller firms, and it is these smaller private firms where most future job creation is 
expected (Kubicek, 1999).   Moreover, these trends do not simply represent convergence 
from compulsory unionization to west European norms: according to the survey data pre-
sented in figure 2, just a few years after the end of communism, east European societies were 
already less unionized than those in west Europe. 
  In a fascinating sociological study, Guglielmo Meardi (2000) has compared union ac-
tivists in Poland and Italy (home respectively of Solidarity and the autunno caldo).   Meardi 
concludes that in terms of class consciousness, union activists in Italy and Poland were more 
alike before the end of communism than at present.  While unions in both countries have suf-
fered from global economic shifts, Italian unionists have experienced change gradually, and 
aim to preserve as much of their past successes as possible, whereas Polish unionists are 
caught up in a much deeper transformation that they themselves helped bring about, and ex-
plicitly reject past orientations and institutions.   This means that far from being resistant to 
change, as some have suggested, Polish unionists embrace change, much of it counter to 
union members’ material interests, including privatization, company-level bargaining, in-
creased wage differentials, redundancy measures and overall flexibility.   The result, Meardi 
argues, is rather than being “behind” Italy in its transition to capitalism, Polish industrial 
relations appear to be more “advanced” in the direction of US-style flexibility. 
Taken together, this evidence suggests that labor weakness in eastern Europe cannot 
be explained simply by referring to the communist legacy, or suggesting that its impact has 
continued to over time unabated.  In fact, such indicators as the relative lack of trust in 
unions as found in survey data appear to decline over time.  At some point, union members 
                                                                                                                                                 
26 For an interesting and critical discussion of the notion of legacy, see Ekiert and Hanson (forthcoming). 
27 Much of this paragraph is drawn from Ost and Crowley, 2001.    33
and activists will likely change their stance toward capitalism and their role in it, if only 
gradually and over a long period.   
Rather than the continued impact of legacies per se explaining weakness, here we 
might join a prevailing intellectual trend and employ a path-dependent argument to better 
explain the relationship between legacy and labor weakness.   In contrast to western Europe, 
where unions met the global “post-Fordist” economy from a position of institutional 
strength, communist-era legacies meant that labor unions in eastern Europe were faced with 
the introduction of capitalism as well as globalization from an initially weak position.   Those 
legacies will likely change over time, and perhaps they already have.   Yet organizationally 
unions have declined to such an extent – in terms of membership, collective bargaining cov-
erage, and the overall ability to deliver tangible rewards to members – that a change in the 
ideological stance of union members and activists will likely not be sufficient to stem further 
union decline.
28  Some have argued about west European unions that, despite their subse-
quent bureaucratization, “their identities, practices, and power remained profoundly marked 
by their origins” as social movement organizations built by grassroots mobilization (Ross 
and Martin, 1999:2).   Such social and organizational capital, while hardly making them in-
vulnerable, has allowed these unions to weather global economic changes.   In contrast, the 
prevailing unions in eastern Europe have had quite different origins, which have more often 
served as handicaps than advantages.   
 
 
 
                                                 
28 This organizational decline should put to rest another potential objection to the argument raised here: that while mem-
bers may have benefited little from postcommunist unions, union elites have often prospered, such as in becoming mem-
bers of parliament, and have used their new positions to defend the organizational interests of unions. If union elites have 
indeed prospered, there is little evidence to suggest this has benefited union organizations rather than union leaders as in-
dividuals. For an elaboration of this point, see Crowley, 2002.   34
Conclusion  
  We have seen that, contrary to expectations, labor has been a weak social and politi-
cal actor throughout the region.   We have seen this weakness in relative strike rates, declin-
ing union membership, as well as a number of more qualitative indicators of labor power.   
This relative lack of labor mobilization occurred despite an economic decline that by many 
indicators was equal to or worse than the Great Depression.   
We examined a number of arguments that have been advanced to explain variations 
in labor mobilezation in the region – economic explanations focusing on the labor market 
and individual exit, political explanations focusing on corporatism and union rivalry– and 
found each of them unable to fully explain that variation.   But more importantly, when 
viewed in a broader comparative perspective, this weakness of labor holds throughout the 
post-communist region, and the more compelling task becomes not explaining variation 
within eastern Europe, but explaining this overall weakness in post-communist societies.   
Moreover, the need for such an explanation becomes all the more compelling when we con-
sider that this labor quiescence has remained largely constant despite the rather sharp macro-
economic and political variations that have emerged in eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union.  Such variations focus our attention on what these societies have in common. 
  Those common features are the institutional and ideological legacies of communism, 
particularly as they impact trade unions.   In every country in the region, the dominant trade 
union remains the one – though variously reformed in each case – that was created by the 
Communist party and that had a monopoly on worker representation under the old regime.   
This past has created significant problems of legitimacy, alongside the simultaneous task of 
restructuring these large organizations to the entirely different demands of the new political 
economy.   We have also seen how the ideological legacy of communism has adversely im-  35
pacted trade unions and workers generally, as workers and union activists are unsure of what 
stance to take toward the capitalist transformations and what role unions might have within 
it.   Perhaps not surprisingly then, surveys throughout the region find repeatedly that unions 
are among the least trusted institutions in society.   When taken together, these legacies of 
the communist period help explain how this region-wide phenomenon – as illustrated by the 
strike data in figure 3 – holds despite the considerable variations in political and economic 
outcomes that have emerged.   In their weakness unions are similar to other components of 
post-communist civil societies, which remain quite weak in comparative perspective 
(Howard, 2002). 
  Yet while the concept of legacy best explains this overall phenomenon, we have also 
found this concept wanting, for it is unable to explain the trends apparent in union weak-
ness.   For example, unions are not stronger, but in important ways weaker, in east central 
Europe where that legacy should have less of an impact.  And by a number of indicators 
unions throughout the region have become less strong over time, even as those communist-
era legacies appear to attenuate.   This would appear to present problems for attempts to ex-
pand not only the EU, but also the model of “social Europe” to the east.   Far from a linear 
transition to west European norms, by some accounts these unions, despite their apparent 
strengths in the communist period, appear to be moving towards a model of labor flexibility 
found in the U.S. and parts of the developing world.   They may yet reconstitute themselves 
in the future as strong labor movements, but there is little evidence at present to suggest this 
will happen.   1 
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Figure 2: Union Density, Official and Survey Rates
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Fig. 3: Strike rates, days not worked per thousand workers, 
1990-00
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Fig. 4: Collective Bargaining Coverage Rates (1995)
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Fig. 5: Unemployment and Strike Rates, eastern Europe, 1992-1999
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Fig. 6: Informal sector employment
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Fig. 7: Trust in Unions, East and West
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